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Usu Venisse Hoc:

Unity and Purpose of Rhetoric in the *Bellum Africum*

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Dedication

To my parents and grandfather: my father, Kenneth, for always finding new ways to bring out the best in me; my mother, Poet, for never letting my obstacles get the best of me; and my grandfather, Herbert, whose love and virtue have forever been a guiding light for me and the whole family. I love you all very much.

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Abstract

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Unity and Purpose of Rhetoric in the *Bellum Africum*

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The University of Texas at Austin, 2016

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This report seeks to bring better understanding specifically to the rhetoric of the *Bellum Africum* and how that understanding sheds new light on the political atmosphere in the aftermath of the assassination of Julius Caesar. Through a literary analysis of various vignettes, monologues, and examples of adaptations of Caesar's own rhetorical style within the *Bellum Africum*, I look to prove that the work's anonymous author consciously sought to create a unified rhetorical program throughout his text which aids the image of the Caesarian cause as it stands at his time of writing in 44/3 BCE. I have found that he does this through a multi-part strategy: he took advantage of the circumstances of the African War, especially Scipio's alliance with Juba, to reframe the civil war as defense from foreign aggression and to downplay Caesar's own monarchical tendencies before his death; pulling from his own military background, he focused in especially on matters of military and political procedure to most vividly contrast the 'Romanness' of the values of the Caesarians and the opposing Pompeians; he divided the legacy of the original Optimates from that of the contemporary Pompeians, casting them as a disconnected and inferior set of political

leaders; lastly, he amplified the pragmatic nature of Caesar's *clementia*, dramatized Caesar's emotional loyalty to the state and its people, and introduced religious connection to Caesar's idea of *felicitas* to elevate Caesar and shift Caesar's original model as servant to the Republic to appear more like a singular leader or savior of the Republic.

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Introduction

In researching for this project, it was impossible not to notice the unusual recentness of the collection of scholarship related to the texts of the *Corpus Caesarianum* not largely written by Caesar himself (the work of the so-called Continuator(s)).¹ This was, for the most part, the fault of the Continuator(s)' questionable Latinity and the poor state of the manuscript tradition.² Through the latter half of the 20th century, interest in the Continuator(s) increased and expanded beyond curiosity into its Latin and historical accuracy into matters of literary technique. The most important scholarly advances have been the recognition that the Continuator(s) were separate authors and that their background as non-noble soldiers could reveal an understudied perspective of Caesar's wars.³ Nevertheless, English scholarship has largely been contained to general overviews or particularities.⁴ I hope for this work to act as a next step in the process of reviving and understanding anew the Continuator(s)' texts and specifically the *Bellum Africum*. By looking at only the *Bellum Africum* and analyzing it in its entirety as a consciously

¹ When I refer to the Continuator(s) and their texts in this work, I specifically mean the *Bellum Alexandrinum*, *Bellum Africum*, and *Bellum Hispaniense*; I'll forgo entering the muddy waters of *De Bello Civili*.

² Cluett (2009) 504-515.

³ In this category, I point especially to the work of Ronald Cluett, who published two recent chapters on the Continuator(s) as a whole: "In Caesar's Wake", outlining the basis for their ideologies in 2003's *Caesar Against Liberty?*, and "The Continuator(s): Soldiering On", a more literary overview in 2009's *Companion to Julius Caesar*. It was these works that sparked hope and interest of finding more in the *Bellum Africum*.

⁴ Jan Felix Gaertner's 2013 work *Caesar and the Bellum Alexandrinum*, which lends its historical analysis of the composition of the Continuator(s) to this work, is one of the only large-scale pieces of scholarship to look at a Continuator as an individual author with his own perspective, style, and goals.

literary text, I hope to grant new consideration to what can be gained from these unique texts.

Although it is not my intention to add to the discussion of the authorship or the date and nature of the publishing of the *Bellum Africum*, it is necessary that I establish my assumptions on these topics that serve as the foundation of the rest of my work. First, I will primarily follow Bouvet's 1997 edition of the text for *Les Belles Lettres*. There is not much competition in this regard, with A.G. Way's 1955 edition for Loeb being the next most recent; the standard edition is Du Pontet's 1900 edition for the Oxford series. Bouvet's edition does not contain the entirety of the *apparatus criticus*, for which I do reference Du Pontet's edition, but Bouvet's approach is thoughtful and incorporates the results of the continuous and mighty labor of sorting out the Continuators' manuscripts. In the rare occurrence in which the manuscript's regular lack of clarity proves problematic for my analysis or I otherwise choose to stray from Bouvet's interpretation, I will clearly note it as such. In respect to both authorship and publishing, I will largely follow the argument laid out by Jan Felix Gaertner in his 2013 work *Caesar and the Bellum Alexandrinum*. Gaertner makes a compelling case that the *Bellum Africum* was likely composed by an officer both knowledgeable of the war and sympathetic to Caesar's cause at the behest of Aulus Hirtius between the death of Caesar in 44 BCE and Hirtius' own death in 43 (or very soon after).⁵ The author of the *Bellum Africum* (whom I

⁵ Gaertner (2013) 15-30 lays out his theory for the collection and publishing process of the *Corpus Caesarianum* under Aulus Hirtius. More specifically on the idea of unedited 'ghost-writers' for the Continuators' texts in the corpus, 25-8.

will henceforth refer to as ‘Anonymous’) is clearly aware of the tropes and goals of the rhetoric of Caesar, but his writing style and his wanderings from the strict Caesarian rhetorical form heavily suggest that this was not written by Caesar or Hirtius. Hirtius remarks in his preface to Book VIII of *De Bello Gallico* that he was unable to participate in the Alexandrian or African campaigns. Although this alone does not rule out his writing of either, the abrupt linguistic and rhetorical change 22 books into the *Bellum Alexandrinum* suggests that Hirtius was unable to find time to proceed further than this on his own.⁶ This is a reasonable theory, as Hirtius was given only a year to write, edit, and publish the *Corpus Caesarianum* in its entirety and the political tumult in the year following Caesar’s death must have always been his primary concern.⁷ With that in mind, Gaertner proposes that Hirtius or an immediate successor called upon other Caesarians who had access to documents and firsthand experience to produce original drafts for the final corpus (drafts that Hirtius would end up with little time to edit).⁸ Gaertner’s proposal explains the linguistic and rhetorical oddities of the *Bellum Africum* and allows the work to be considered through the new lens of a text produced in the wake of Caesar’s death, a hastily-made weapon in a sudden and desperate war of information.

It is precisely this circumstance that allows the eccentricities of Anonymous to trickle through into the *Bellum Africum*. Anonymous was without doubt “an ardent, but

⁶ Gaertner (2013) 164-5.

⁷ Hirtius was already deep within the political circles at Rome by Caesar’s death, and his election as Consul for 43 would have only further solidified his position as a key player following Caesar’s assassination, especially since Hirtius was already designated for the position by Caesar before his death (Syme 95). He was killed at the siege of Mutina as a member of Octavian’s forces.

⁸ Gaertner (2013) 26-7.

not always a balanced, partisan”, as A.G. Way noted in his introduction to the work for Loeb, but Way very much misses the mark to claim that Anonymous especially suffered from “errors into which his blind admiration for Caesar occasionally leads him”.⁹ Instead, Anonymous largely sticks to the Caesarian script, detailing the war’s narrative while praising Caesar’s famed *celeritas*, his passion for each individual soldier, and his pragmatic and disarming *clementia*. Anonymous’ errors, if Gaertner is to be followed, can be ascribed to the gap in time between the war and Anonymous’ writing, as well as gaps in his information created by his lower rank and holes in his collection of reports. Recent scholarship has shown the many ways in which the Continuators both follow Caesar’s own rhetorical program and yet often present material that Caesar would find unacceptable in his own work.¹⁰ Since Anonymous follows Caesar’s rhetoric so closely and since he is knowingly writing a work meant to improve the image of the recently deceased general, we can infer that Anonymous’ rhetorical quirks, too, were genuinely meant to help the Caesarian cause.

As mentioned above, individual aspects of Anonymous’ background and literary tendencies have been studied in the recent past and broad overviews have touched upon the major themes of The Continuators as a whole.¹¹ Those works are the critical foundation of my own. What I have done below, however, is consider on a larger scale

⁹ Way 141 and 142, respectively.

¹⁰ On the Continuators as aware of Caesarian rhetoric, Cluett (2003) 130, backing up Bouvet xxvi-xxvii and Diouron lxi-lxii and the inclusion of the Continuators’ material in Goldsworthy (2000) 193-220 *passim*.. On The Continuators as unique from Caesar, see Cluett (2009) 518-21 and, e.g., Dorado on narrative techniques, Milne 123-92 on soldierly introspection, and Murphy 309-17 on their unique application of *felicitas Caesariana*.

¹¹ The best survey of recent scholarship on the Continuators is Cluett (2009).

how it is that Anonymous of the *Bellum Africum* in particular portrays a different view of Caesar and his army and reveals a unique contemporary perspective on what rhetoric would most improve the image of Caesar in the wake of his death. As previously mentioned above, I have accepted the argument that this work is an immediate reaction to the political vacuum and propagandistic chaos of the year following the assassination of Caesar. Writing in the defense of Caesar and his allies in such circumstances naturally requires a different approach than Caesar would have needed to take in the years when he would have been writing *De Bello Gallico*. Caesar's career has fully played out and his final years were most noticeably defined by his political actions at home, not his former military actions abroad. Furthermore, the gears were already turning to secure a new leader for state and faction and to continue the work that Caesar had begun; to do so would still require immense political capital in the face of the aggressive counter-campaign by the liberators and the drastic decrease in authority and mandate created by the loss of Caesar.

My goal, then, is to prove that Anonymous has his own view of Caesar and his project that can be inferred from the *Bellum Africum* and that he knowingly applies and reforms Caesarian rhetoric to create a work with a specific and unified message. I will seek to prove that this specific, targeted, and unified message makes the *Bellum Africum* an important piece of evidence in understanding how Caesar's allies reacted to the aftermath of his death. To achieve the goal of promoting Caesar and his camp within such an atmosphere, Anonymous uses vignettes interspersed throughout his narrative of the

African campaign to frame the work within the question of “what qualities and actions make up the type of Roman leaders that are currently most useful to the Republic?”

He returns time and again to the success or failure of each side to adhere to traditional Roman political and military procedure as a way to strip Pompeian leader Metellus Scipio and his allies (hereafter referred to only as Scipio) of their Roman status and re-define the war as one of Roman defense against foreign monarchical tyranny. He further obscures the issue of civil war and the contrast of Caesar against Optimate legends Cato and Pompey by forging a temporal and social disconnect between those men and the rest of the Pompeian faction. By arguing that the Pompeians of the *Bellum Africum* (and by extension, of his own time) have neither the nature nor the principles of these famous leaders, Anonymous is able to escape the question of whether Cato and Pompey would have been the better victors for Rome. In the most recent years before the writing of the *Bellum Africum*, the Romans had Caesar and they had the ‘other’ Pompeians; this is a far easier and far less delicate comparison to make in preserving Caesar’s legacy. Finally, he amplifies the pragmatic nature of Caesar’s *clementia*, dramatizes Caesar’s emotional loyalty to the state and its people, and introduced some religious connection to Caesar’s idea of *felicitas* to elevate Caesar and shift Caesar’s original model as servant to the Republic into a character one could envision as a singular leader or savior of the Republic (without saying as much). In achieving these goals, Anonymous occasionally forgoes sensitivity in addressing complex scenarios of proper conduct, such as Caesar’s soldiers’ misconduct at Thapsus and Caesar’s execution of

Publius Ligarius, to argue more directly for the universal effectiveness and rightness of Caesar as leader.

Anonymous as a Conscious Rhetorician

That Anonymous employed and modified the literary technique of his time needs only a brief discussion since I seek only to dismiss the notion that any and all literary findings in the *Bellum Africum* are happenstance. Jan Felix Gaertner has analyzed at length the technique and style both of the *Bellum Alexandrinum* and of the *Bellum Hispaniense* and convincingly shown that these works fit within the progress of the standard techniques of Roman historiography.¹² The *Bellum Africum* has received its own attention in this regard from elsewhere, most notably from Antonio Dorado. He recently organized the narrative techniques of Anonymous, many of which will be on display later in this work, breaking down the narrators' use of narratorial interjection, numerical exaggeration, fictitious vignettes, biased interpretation, and exoticism for effect.¹³ As my discussion continues, I will reference such techniques when necessary as an integral part of the rhetorical point at hand.

One objection to my interpretations of the *Bellum Africum* could be derived from that long-held belief that the Continuators were poor Latinists with little literary ambition. First is the matter of Anonymous' interest in politicizing his text. I will follow in Gaertner's argument that Hirtius' role in the political conflict after Caesar's death and

¹² Chapters 3 and 4 of Gaertner (2013) and Gaertner (2009) 243-59, respectively.

¹³ Dorado (2012)

his interest in finishing the *commentarii* soon thereafter suggests that his intentions were primarily driven by re-enforcing and continuing pro-Caesar propaganda in the political tug-of-war after his assassination.¹⁴ Anonymous, then, was surely aware of Hirtius' project and what role his text was to have in that project. As I have referenced throughout, Anonymous at least shows a knowledge of what Caesar's own rhetoric looked like and was clearly aware of how to employ it himself. The argument may continue, then, that Anonymous had no greater skill than to regurgitate Caesar's abilities, rather than rely on any of his own. It is to those two points that I briefly address in this section, reviewing recent scholarship on the literary techniques found in the *Bellum Africum* and then seeking to prove through reference to the text that Anonymous' program has a unity within the text and between ideas that could only be the result of a purposeful effort.

In the most basic sense, one can see a unity of the text in its continued and regular use both of its rhetoric and of its literary techniques. Balance between the "military report" narration of the war's events and the digressive vignettes keeps the reader interested by varying style, but it also allows the reader to reflect on the vignettes and impose the rhetoric upon the narration for him. While Anonymous is building and re-enforcing his points through the scattered vignettes, he is building up Caesar's eventual victory in the narrative of events. This allows the reader to build a positive correlation between the morals which Anonymous sermonizes and the results on the battlefield

¹⁴ Gaertner 160-5.

without Anonymous having to expressly make the argument himself. Anonymous does not simply alternate for style's sake either. As will be shown below, Anonymous looks to establish all of his key themes early in the text (almost all of them in some fashion by section 8)¹⁵; after building, intermingling, and playing with these themes throughout the text's vignettes, Anonymous then forgoes most of the historical account of the final battle at Thapsus and its aftermath to instead bring together his program and most clearly contrast the nature of the two sides in victory and defeat. This gives the text not just its historical narrative direction, but also a sense of rhetorical structure (albeit a simple one).

Anonymous is able to move beyond this level of unity, however, and make connections between his ideas and his multiple parts of his own text. When Caesar withdraws from Thapsus after failing to engage diplomatically with Vergilius near the end of the text in *B. Afr.* 86, for instance, it recalls Caesar's identical withdraw from Hadrumetum in *B. Afr.* 5. Even with an entire ugly war between the two events and the balance of power having entirely reversed, Caesar is the same politician at the end of the work as he is at the beginning. The mention of Vergilius alone does not necessarily recall Vergilius' treacherous promise of mercy to Titus Salienus from *B. Afr.* 28, but, unlike at Hadrumetum, here Caesar specifically reminds Vergilius of his mercy as part of his plea for Vergilius to surrender, thus setting up the actions of the two for contrast (*B. Afr.* 86.2.2-3).

¹⁵ Notably, the Pompeian army consisting mostly of Numidians starts at *B. Afr.* 4 and 6; Caesar's interest in peace and attention to military procedure in 4; the Pompeians have shown bad military procedure and confused hierarchy in 7; the Numidians are painted as improper fighters in 7; Caesar pities the Pompeians rejection of Rome and willing submission to Juba in 8.

Anonymous' themes also create a cohesive whole, as he largely seeks to contrast each faction under the same categories: Loyalty to Roman ideals (especially over personal interest), respect of hierarchy and military procedure, levels of honesty and mercy, and military skill. Anonymous is even able to fit the contrast between the two into single vignettes, allowing the parallelism to briefly become more apparent without overrelying on direct and expressed comparison: Labienus wastes time insulting a veteran soldier in *B. Afr.* 16 while Caesar is shown busy and brilliant on the battleline in sections 15 and 17 right around it. Beyond the fact that these categories are equally applied to each side, the categories themselves work together to create a single image of each faction's Romanity as can be discerned from their visible actions. Anonymous uses the story of the African War to argue that worthiness to rule belongs to the most Roman and that a simple survey of the deeds of each side will show that Romanity belongs to the Caesarians by a large margin.

Discrediting the Pompeians

The backbone of Anonymous' program is his use of dramatic vignettes. These vignettes almost never have a large impact on the war, often resulting in the death of an unnamed soldier or merely recording a conversation. Instead, these vignettes exist to establish and maintain the major lines of rhetoric used throughout the work, most notably by means of dividing and contrasting Caesar and the Pompeians in philosophy and actions. Anonymous' program against the Pompeians can be broken down into three arguments: they fail at executing traditional Roman procedure, their unflattering association with the Numidian king Juba revokes their Roman status, and that the contemporary Pompeians' notion that this is still a civil war is delusional.¹⁶ In making this collection of arguments, Anonymous converts the civil war into a more traditional Roman war against barbarous foreigners, in this case to protect a Roman province. In particular, Anonymous is skillfully able to promote the Caesarian cause in 44/3 BCE by whitewashing the lengthy civil war as Republican service and attacking the integrity of his contemporary Pompeian opponents through his depiction of the Pompeian delusions both that they are still Romans acting for the Roman state and that they are legitimate heirs of the fight carried on by Pompey Magnus and Cato. Below, I have analyzed a selection of these vignettes displaying rhetorical execution of each of these arguments respectively.

¹⁶ On the matter of procedure, Aislinn Melchior has laid the foundation for this aspect of the argument with her look at the Pompeians as failures in understanding *exempla* of Roman values (241-57).

Violation of Military and Political Procedure

The first digressive vignette arrives already in *B. Afr.* 4, just after Caesar's arrival at Africa. Anonymous relays an interaction between the Scipio-appointed commander of Hadrumetum, Considius, and a random captive sent by the Caesar campaign to negotiate:

'Unde', inquit [Considius], 'istas?' Tum captivus: 'Imperatore a Caesare.' Tum Considius, 'Unus est,' inquit, 'Scipio imperator hoc tempore populi Romani'; deinde in conspectu statim captivum interfici iubet litterasque nondum perlectas, sicut erant signatae, dat homini certo ad Scipionem perferendas. (B. Afr. 4.8-14)

"From where exactly is your letter?" Considius asks. The captive replies, "From *Imperator* Caesar." "There is only one *imperator* of the Roman people right now", says Considius, "Scipio." Then he orders the captive to be killed before him immediately and he gives the letter, still unread and left just as it had been pressed, to some person to carry off to Scipio.

In this scene, Considius claims that Scipio is "the only *imperator* of the Roman People". While the claim that Scipio is currently an *imperator* is technically true as he has been hailed by his troops without yet receiving triumph, the contrast between this claim of the ceremonial title (which has already been mocked by Caesar himself in *BC* 3.31.1) and Caesar's legitimate *imperium* derived from his current office of consul is stark (Caesar had just conveniently transferred straight from dictator to consul during his most recent return to Rome in late 47).¹⁷ Scipio holds the province of Africa illegally (so

¹⁷ Goldsworthy (2006) 452. For a brief overview of this period politically for Caesar, Goldsworthy (2006) 448-454.

far as the record and deduction will tell)¹⁸ without any office of *imperium* and has claimed sole control over *imperium* throughout the Roman world, a right granted not even to dictators. The phrase *imperator populi Romani* does not appear to ever refer to a general awaiting a triumph; instead, Cicero uses it exclusively of men currently serving the state in the role of proconsul, which Scipio is quite notably *not* doing here.¹⁹ This section both shows the disregard for Roman law of the Pompeian forces and their anti-Republican nature. This scene and the one I am about to address also underscore Anonymous' argument throughout the text that the Pompeians thoroughly misunderstand the current political situation in two ways. First, they are shown as incorrect regarding their legal legitimacy. As regards this scene, for instance, Scipio is not a state-recognized *imperator* of anything and he is most certainly not the "one *imperator* of the Roman people". Anonymous proposes that they are disconnected from the legal realities of the Roman state and are adopting the vocabulary of Juba's monarchy (in which they have little say, as we will see).

The following scene represents the other sort of delusion, that of the nature of the war and their cause. As here, only the Pompeians explicitly mention that this is a civil war during the *Bellum Africum*, while Anonymous and Caesar both frame the war as a matter of protection of Roman allies from foreigners. The Senate will ultimately come to

¹⁸ He was proconsul of Syria in 48, but since the end of that term no elections have been held and Caesar has been dictator and now consul. Attius Varus has had to yield control of Africa to Scipio upon his arrival, but due to Pompeian pressure, not a legitimate change of office.

¹⁹ Cicero calls Servilius an *imperator populi Romani* at *Verr.* 2.1.56.9 when he was the appointed proconsul in the fight against the Cilician pirates. *Verr.* 2.2.40.5-6 refers to Publius Rupilius' time as proconsul of Sicily in 131 BCE when he established the provinces' laws.

the similar conclusion that this was only a war against King Juba and not Romans, whatever their reasoning for doing so.²⁰ In his own works, Caesar often gives each side's perspective in order to show the Pompeians' wrong assumptions and suggest that the Pompeians are out of touch with the reality around them as a way of demonstrating his superior foresight.²¹ Anonymous reworks that trope to re-enforce his bolder argument that the Pompeians are (no longer) Roman, thus both legitimizing Caesar's actions and avoiding the tricky subject of civil war.²² While this notion will tint all of the interactions between the sides throughout the work, I will return to the latter delusion in greater depth in my later discussion of Cato.

This issue of military office and procedure is carried over into a later vignette in *B. Afr.* 44-6, which retells the story of a trireme of Caesarian soldiers intercepted on their way from Sicily and taken to Scipio. Scipio argues to the soldiers that they have been brainwashed (similar to the argument made by Labienus in *B. Afr.* 16, as I will discuss later) and that switching sides now will make them defenders of the Republic and will grant them their lives and a monetary gift. Scipio's appeal to defend the Republic frames the struggle as a civil one: Scipio has already accepted Caesar as Roman by calling him *imperator*. Caesar makes no such appeal in the acceptance of any sort of fugitive or prisoner; he simply accepts them into the fold according to rank and need. One of the soldiers—Anonymous is careful to mention that he is specifically a member of the 14th legion, raised by Caesar—thanks Scipio (whom he will not call *imperator*) but rejects the

²⁰ Goldsworthy (2006) 468.

²¹ On this technique especially in *De Bello Civili*, Grillo 72-7.

²² On the trouble that civil war creates just in the matter of Caesar's *clementia*, see Grillo 103-5.

offer to fight against *meum imperatorem* Caesar, under whose dignity and victory he claims to have served for 36 years. Scipio is furious at the centurion's loyalty and has him executed; in Scipio's failure to see a positive *exemplum* in the centurion, Anonymous has marked him as out of touch with Roman values and thus unfit to rule Romans.²³

Obviously, he cannot literally mean 36 years under Caesar, despite all the manuscripts reading thus. Emanuel Hoffmann has suggested 13 years, to approximately match Caesar's military career.²⁴ Some, such as A.G. Way, have argued for a literal 36 years of service and a rhetorical overstatement of his time under Caesar.²⁵ If Way is right, it might be more nuanced than a simple exaggeration. The centurion has perhaps conflated his 36 years of service to the Republic into 36 years under Caesar as part of Anonymous' interest in blurring the lines between the two entities, Caesar and the Republic. If Caesar *is* the Republic, then there is no error in seeing his previous career as merely aid to their fated upcoming champion. Admittedly, the interpretation feels somewhat overwrought, but it does make sense of the manuscripts as they universally stand and does fit the general portrayal of the relationship between Caesar and the Republic in the text.

Here in *B. Afr.* 44-6, the issue of *imperator* has come back around and now the legal and procedural matter comes to the forefront. Anonymous has laid the groundwork of his argument early in the text (in section 7 above), and then re-emphasizes or refines it much later in the text, often near the middle or near key moments towards the end of the

²³ Melchior 243-6.

²⁴ Du Pontet *B. Afr.* n.45.3.3

²⁵ Way 214.

work. Unlike Considius, Scipio will call Caesar *imperator*; the inconsistency of Pompeian speech and thought is a common tool for presenting their perfidy in the *Corpus Caesarianum* and here the suggestion may be that Scipio's formality is not to be trusted. The legionary will not return the title to Scipio, however, despite Scipio's warm welcome and claim to legitimacy. As Maria Gracia posits, this is a matter of to whom a soldier has sworn his oaths of loyalty; this legionary is legally and culturally bound to Caesar and without being properly defeated on the battlefield and accepted through a new oath, his loyalty must remain with Caesar.²⁶ The legionary shows an important contrast from Considius earlier in the work: while he rejects the title of *imperator* for Scipio, he does not claim that Caesar is *unus imperator*, but simply *meum imperatorem*. Caesar and his soldiers inherently follow the Roman rules of war and hierarchy and it is arguably the most important difference between the two camps to our author.

As Subordinates of the Numidian Monarchy

Anonymous is able to construct his full alienation of the Pompeians and their viewpoint mostly because they themselves gave him the avenue to do so. As Anonymous is always quick to mention when he is able, Scipio has entered into a political and military agreement with Juba, the king of the Numidians. The alliance has granted Scipio

²⁶ Gracia pp. 84-6. Per page 84: "Durante las guerras civiles romanas los soldados se dirigen a su *imperator* como tal y niegan ese mismo tratamiento al *imperator* del bando contrario: puesto que no militan bajo su *imperium* y auspicios, no es ante él ante quien han pronunciado su juramento sagrado y, por consiguiente, no reconocen su legalidad."

a large army of Numidian cavalry, at a heavy expense to his treasury and political independence. Again looking to establish his major points early, Anonymous digresses in *B. Afr.* 8 to explain Caesar's newfound knowledge of the political situation in Africa. While stationed at Leptis, Caesar learns more about the current relationship between Juba and Scipio, and in doing so blasts Scipio and the Pompeians on their virtue, vision, and loyalty to state:

Ipse interea ex perfugis et incolis cognitis condicionibus Scipionis et qui cum eo bellum contra se gerebant, miserari —regium enim equitatum Scipio ex provincia Africa alebat—tanta homines esse dementia ut malint regis esse vectigales quam cum civibus in patria in suis fortunis esse incolumes. (B. Afr. 8.5.1-7)

Meanwhile, when he learned from refugees and locals about the conditions between Scipio and those waging war against himself with [Scipio]—for Scipio was maintaining royal cavalry from the coffers of the province of Africa—he pitied that men were so deranged as to prefer to be tribute payers to a king than to be safe in their fortunes in their own fatherland with their fellow citizens.

First, regardless of whether Scipio has legal right to the province's budget (or indeed what kind of money raising the author means at all with *ex provincia Africa*), the author has pointed us towards the unnatural inversion that is a Roman province being forced to pay out of pocket for foreign protection. Scipio has been castigated by Caesar for his ruthless and improper abuse of Syria while Scipio was proconsul there; to do the same to Africa not only with no Roman authority, but with foreign monarchic authority is unbearable.²⁷ Furthermore, the author's use of *vectigales* to refer to Scipio is brutal and unmistakable. When referring to a specific state or person, the word overwhelmingly has

²⁷ *BC* 3.31-3: Caesar's account of Scipio's abuses of power in Syria

implications of being politically subjugated, not merely of being taxed. In describing the thinking of the Pompeians in their flight to Juba as *tanta dementia*, Anonymous has strongly marked the Pompeian understanding, right down to their loyalty to their inherent nature and what is objectively good, as downright delusional.

What makes Scipio's situation so perverse to Caesar is that he has chosen to submit to Juba (*B. Afr.* 8.5.5: *malint regis esse vectigales quam cum civibus in patria...esse incolumes*). Unlike those in the Roman provinces, Scipio had all the rights of Roman citizenship; he willingly surrendered the benefits of his Roman status and shamefully subjugated himself to a foreign power in a quest for power and a misunderstanding of the good. As he often does, the author has magnified Scipio's lack of Romanity by contrasting it with Caesar's; the great benefits of citizenship to Caesar are obvious: the unity, good fortune, and interdependence of the Roman people (*B. Afr.* 8.5.6: *cum civibus in patria in suis fortunis esse incolumes*). That is what the inherently Roman Caesar finds irresistible and that is what Scipio has left behind. As will be discussed in greater depth just below, Anonymous is also pointing towards the suggestion that there is, in fact, no civil strife in Rome, and that the Pompeians had and have no reasonable excuse not to be in Rome enjoying the freedom and safety that could come from an honest effort to improve the state through standard and polite means at home.

The extent to which the proper hierarchy has been subverted and the sense of Romanity has been perverted throughout the Pompeian side is expounded further later on in the text in *B. Afr.* 57 before the battle near Uzitta. Following a large scale desertion from the Pompeian side of noble Gaetulians, Scipio sends an embassy to his subordinate

Marcus Aquinius, informing him that he was to cease communication with the Caesarian Gaius Saserna (*B. Afr.* 57.1.3-2.2). Aquinius outright rejects his commander's request, insisting that he finish his negotiations with Saserna. When Juba hears of this, he sends Aquinius the fantastically laconic demand: *Vetat te rex colloqui* (57.3.1). Aquinius is terrified by the message and immediately complies. Anonymous forgoes the subtlety that Caesar might have employed by leaving the implication to the reader in order to drive home his point clearly, rather than gracefully. Here instead, mimicking the digression at section 8 on Scipio's submission, Anonymous launches a short monologue on the perversion of affairs within the Juba-Scipio camp.

Anonymous so thoroughly breaks down the main arguments of his work within this monologue that it is worth a closer look in its entirety.

usu venisse hoc civi Romano et ei qui ab populo Romano honores accepisset, incolumi patria fortunisque omnibus Iubae barbaro potius oboedientem fuisse quam aut Scipionis obtemperasse nuntio aut caesis eiusdem partis civibus incolumem reverti malle! (*B. Afr.* 57.3.2-4.1)

“So it has come to this! A Roman citizen, and one who had received office from the Roman people at that, when his fatherland and all his fortunes were safe, would rather submit to the barbarous Juba than either to have obeyed the message of Scipio or, with the citizens of the opposing faction killed, to prefer to return home safely!”

The accusative of exclamation and the dramatic idiom *usu venisse hoc* to begin this passage set the tone as invective from the very beginning. Such a monologue takes advantage of Anonymous' separation from Caesar's character to press his points more boldly than his former leader.²⁸ Furthermore, by clearly disconnecting this monologue

²⁸ Dorado 37-8 collects and sketches Anonymous' technique of “irrupción empática”.

from the rest of his narrative and clearly shifting register, Anonymous establishes this opinion as his own, attaching the highest concern with proper Roman conduct and loyalty not only to Caesar during the African War, but to himself and his fellow Caesarians at the time of composition in 44.

Anonymous twice mentions Aquinius' Roman status, elevating the outrage by mentioning his elected office in the extension of his original point. Submission to foreign influence is unacceptable for any Roman (so all the Pompeians are at fault), but it is especially treacherous and dishonorable for a distinguished representative of the Roman people. This accusation lands upon every Pompeian in Africa, all the way up to Scipio. Picking up on his rhetoric from section 8, Anonymous again attacks the Pompeians for fleeing Rome willingly in order to submit to a foreign king, dismissing the possibly acceptable excuses that they joined Juba out of necessity since their home or livelihood were in danger. This heightens the extent of their treachery and places more weight upon the suggestion that such leaders are no longer truly Roman. Anonymous advances again the notion that Rome is currently safe for all Roman leaders (cf. 8.5.7: *in suis fortunis esse incolumes*). Here, Anonymous can, in a new way, suggest that this is no grand war on which control of the Roman state rests. Aquinius, like Scipio, was always welcome to return to Rome and enjoy his own fortunes without any troubles whatsoever (a suggestion that leans on the propaganda of Caesar's pragmatic leniency and zealous desire for peace). Instead, these previously well-distinguished Romans, with no good reason, have accepted inferior roles in a barbaric monarchy for what can only be nefarious and improper causes. Just as *tanta dementia* does in the first passage, *usu venisse* emphasizes

the extremity and peculiarity of the Pompeians' actions on the scale of proper Roman conduct. Having finished with Aquinius, Anonymous moves onto Juba and Scipio:

atque etiam et superbius Iubae factum non in M. Aquinium hominem novum parvumque senatorem, sed in Scipionem hominem illa familia dignitate honoribus praestantem. namque cum Scipio sagulo purpureo ante regis adventum uti solitus esset, dicitur Iuba cum eo egisse, non oportere illum eodem vestitu atque ipse uteretur. itaque factum est ut Scipio ad album sese vestitum transferret et Iubae homini superbissimo ineptissimoque obtemperaret. (B. Afr. 57.4.1-6.3)

“And yet it was not Juba’s deed towards Marcus Aquinius, a new man and low-ranked senator, that was most arrogant, but towards Scipio, an outstanding man with such family, dignity, and offices, for although Scipio was accustomed to wear the general’s purple coat before the arrival of the king, Juba is said to have told him that he ought not wear the same outfit as he himself wore, and thus it happened that Scipio changed over to a white outfit and submitted to Juba, the haughtiest and most tactless man.”

Anonymous returns to his unique approach to handling the issues of civil war and the high Roman honors of his enemies. Instead of dismissing, ignoring, or attacking Scipio’s previous record, he acknowledges and praises all of the best Roman features of Scipio. Anonymous then circumvents the issue of fighting against such a prominent Roman figure by drawing a clear temporal divide between versions of Scipio. He has, to some extent, already done this by giving us one point of conversion, in which Scipio has metaphorically fled his Roman status for his inferior position within Juba’s monarchy. Furthermore, Anonymous has marked Juba as *ineptissimus*: most awkward or improper. Scipio’s orders are now all taken by a man specifically described as unable or unwilling to follow social and political convention. Here, however, Anonymous paints a more vivid metaphor, in which Scipio literally takes off the purple cloak that marks him in the official role of ‘Roman general and puts on a humble white outfit. In this moment, he has

willingly surrendered his past; however glorious a man ‘Scipio the Roman general’ was before this moment, Anonymous can now leave all of that behind and focus instead on the shameful new ‘Numidian assistant Scipio’. Temporal divisions of character will get used by Anonymous again in his handling of the legacies of Pompey Magnus and especially of Cato, as I will discuss later. Anonymous has also placed his attack technically on Juba, following up on the idea that he and the Numidian Kingdom are the true enemy and that this is therefore purely a war against a foreign power (aided by ex-Romans). Focusing on Juba as actor also doubles down on showing the utter lack of authority and importance Scipio has within his new system, sapping any possibly hint of Roman influence within the Numidian system. Juba demands that things happen and *factum est ut*; the only action Scipio takes is to willingly and immediately obey the orders (*transferret*). There is again here, as in Juba’s original intercession earlier in the section, no sign of protest or displeasure signaled from Scipio at all.

Thus, this monologue steps away from the narrative to re-establish around the halfway point of the text most of the major rhetorical points and themes that Anonymous weaves throughout the *Bellum Africum*. Scipio and the Pompeians have quite voluntarily foregone their role in the Roman world in order to take up inferior positions under a foreign monarch without good cause. In doing so, they have surrendered their previous identity, thus solving the matter of civil war by re-molding the war as protection of the African province from Juba. The reader should disregard the previous legacies of the Pompeians, which Anonymous praises in order to firm up his own credentials as a concerned and loyal Roman (cf. Caesar’s *miserari* at Scipio’s actions in section 8), since

the Pompeians did so themselves, thus removing any remaining unease from the reader about the civil nature of the war. The focus on respect of military and political status, dismissal of diplomatic commands over monarchical orders, and the thorough perversion of expected hierarchy re-enforces Anonymous' insistence that an upright Roman can be discerned through their actions, most notably their willingness and ability to uphold the military and political tradition of the Roman Republic.

So then, once Anonymous has established a strong connection between Scipio, Juba and his cavalry, and submission to the Numidian monarchy, he regularly emphasizes the negative qualities of the Numidian cavalry and their ubiquitous nature in the Pompeian army. This allows him to constantly remind his audience of the relationship between the Pompeians and Juba and to attach the disapproved traits and battle tactics to the Pompeians through association. This is a way for Anonymous to 'barbarize' the Pompeians in two-fold fashion: first, it attacks the Pompeians' character as inherently un-Roman, and therefore inferior, a common tactic in Caesar's own writing ²⁹; second, it calls back the political fact that the Pompeians are acting under the sway of a foreign authority, and thus should have their Romanity questioned.

Anonymous does not waste any time in setting up most of his rhetoric regarding the Numidians as part of the Pompeian army, having settled most of his stereotypes by section 7. The very first time that any opposing forces are mentioned, Gnaeus Piso is marching towards Hadrumetum and is noted only to have 3,000 Mauritanians (*Mauri*) as

²⁹ Grillo 106-120 on the use of barbarization rhetorically in the late Republic and its specific use in *De Bello Civili*.

his army (*B. Afr.* 3.1.4-5). Although King Bogud and Mauritania are strong and important allies of Caesar, Anonymous does not seem interested in drawing much of a line with this term, which he uses rarely and vaguely. In fact, Anonymous tends to ignore Bogud and the allied Mauritians in general, which makes his job of broadly casting Juba and Scipio's armies as foreign. One of the only other uses of the term is in describing a collection of enemy troops from Hadrumetum and a section of Juba's royal cavalry which pursues Caesar as he leaves from the town. It is likely, then, that the 2,000 Mauritians dislodged by Caesar's 300 Gauls in section 6 are from Juba's royal cavalry (*B. Afr.* 6.3.1-3). After describing Caesar's regular skirmishes with the same army in their recession from the town, Anonymous switches without note to describing the cavalry as Numidian (*Numidae*), thus erasing the ethnic exacts in favor of a broader political umbrella of locals under the authority of Juba (*B. Afr.* 6.6.2-6.7.1).

The common tactics of the Numidians are revealed in this same section. Anonymous notes that, even after the incredible success of the Gauls, the Numidians repeatedly attacked Caesar's rearguard, were repulsed, and collected up again for another attack. Anonymous shows frustration at their style: "Since they were doing this quite often, now they were following us, now again they were turned back to the town" (*B. Afr.* 6.5.1-3). This is the beginning of the many complaints of Anonymous' that the Numidians do not know how to fight with honor, a trait that we are naturally expected to extend to their employers. In the following section, Anonymous touches upon the other common trait of the Numidians as fighters: they ambush and fear open fighting. In explaining an attack by Mauritanian cavalry upon some of Caesar's rowers who were

foraging, Anonymous describes it as a predictable feature of their culture: “For they (i.e. *equites Mauri*) lie in ambush with their horses between the valleys so they can appear suddenly, and so they do not fight it out in the field at close quarters” (*B. Afr.* 7.6.1-3). Thus, by the time that Caesar has only barely landed in Africa, Anonymous has established the tone for the Numidian forces: they refuse to fight properly in the open field, they engage in regular ambush, and they are both the common soldier of the Pompeians and the common soldier of Juba’s royal cavalry. This character description is something that he can allude to later on to color important scenes of battle and grow through more vivid descriptions of their cowardice and perfidy along the way, all the while dishonoring the Pompeian leaders for their continued employment. This is a natural reverse of the regular praising of the *virtus* of Caesar’s soldiers as a way to enhance the uprightness and Romanity of Caesar as leader.³⁰

The internal mirroring of the Numidians and the Pompeians can be seen in *B. Afr.* 38-40, wherein the Numidians are the literal starting place of panic that spells defeat for the Pompeians on the plains before Ruspina. Caesar has found himself caught in a difficult position; attempting to prepare fortifications before dislodging a set of Numidian turrets, he has realized that Labienus is advancing more troops to disrupt his work and threaten his position. At once, Caesar makes the correct decision, launching a corps of his Spanish troops upon the turrets. When Labienus releases his right wing in relief, Caesar has already outstripped him with an interception by his own left wing (*B. Afr.* 38-9).

³⁰ *B. Afr.* sections 16, 45, and 84 show off the moral goodness of Caesar’s soldiers on and off the battlefield; 81.1.10-2.4 on Caesar’s use of such compliments on his own soldiers for encouragement; On *virtus* of Caesar’s soldiers as a defining factor of victory in *De Bello Gallico*, Riggsby 83-96.

Making literal that which is often metaphorical, Labienus cannot see this part of the battlefield while Caesar can; thus, Caesar wins the day through sight, rather than foresight. The first reaction we receive is that of the Numidians, who immediately turn in terror, thus sparking Labienus' own hastened retiring from the battlefield (*B. Afr.* 40.2.2-3: *in terrorem converso equitatu Numidarum recta in castra fugere [Labienus] contendit*).

Anonymous thus unites the Numidians' and Labienus' actions into one, allowing him to starkly contrast them with the Gauls' and Germans' reactions in the following sentence. Anonymous mentions their refusal to leave the battlefield twice in this sentence, describing them as *qui restiterant* and *restantes*, quite a difference from the *fugere contendit* which finished the previous line and which refers quite specifically to Labienus. Not a single Gaul or German flees, as they are slaughtered wholesale by the advancing Caesarians (*conciduntur universi*). This disaster frightens Scipio's legions, who have been drawn up in front of camp, but are left unused; they are blinded by fear (*terrore occaecatae*) at the sight of the brave Germans' and Gauls' massacre. Caesar has thus won the day in a traditional manner, outsmarting and outstripping his opponent to secure a key location.³¹ Anonymous has painted a larger picture than that, however, in construing the Numidians as the leaders of the disastrous panic. By placing Labienus' and the Numidians' actions together and only then contrasting them with the Germans and Gauls in a separate phrase, Anonymous has drawn their tendencies closer together and re-

³¹ I have specifically in mind the race between Caesar and Scipio at Ilerda, as laid out by Grillo 16-22. On Caesar's reported speed of mind and action as traditional Roman values for a general, Goldsworthy (1998) 195-202.

enforced the importance of the Numidian forces in the Pompeian armies. The aforementioned lack of use of Scipio's legions both separates civil bloodshed from the scene and highlights Scipio's inaction in comparison to Caesar's swiftness and re-emphasizes the Pompeian preference towards leaning on their foreign forces.

That Anonymous had a keen interest in using the Germans and Gauls as a foil for the Numidians (and thus the Pompeians) is left beyond doubt by the unusual ethnography that wraps up the battle in section 40. When the battle comes to a close and everyone has returned to camp, Anonymous lingers on Caesar's fascination with the corpses of the Germans and Gauls (*B. Afr.* 40.5.4-5). It is as certain to the reader as it is to Anonymous that Caesar has already seen many a Gallic corpse during his campaigns, so the extra subsection to describe this wonderment of Caesar's must serve some other purpose than to introduce the Gauls and Germans. Anonymous rather abruptly moves from Caesar's interest in their physical bodies (*mirifica corpora* though they were) to list the various reasons that they had joined up with Labienus in the first place. Some of them followed Labienus out of Gaul after the original wars there led by Caesar due to their admiration for his authority (a call back to Labienus' previous loyalty and success *De Bello Gallico*), some have joined on board by the promise of wealth, and some who were spared by Labienus following the defeat of Curio gained a gracious loyalty for their benefactor. Such a sparing by the Pompeian side is notable, as multiple vignettes in the *Bellum*

Africum attack the Pompeians for quick and unjust execution of Caesarian (i.e., Roman) prisoners of war, often after a promise of safety.³²

The scene also establishes a sort of “noble savage” out of the Gauls and Germans, a rather surprising contrast with the portrait of these peoples depicted by Caesar in *De Bello Gallico*. Caesar paints the Gauls and Germans in much the same way as Anonymous does the Numidians: perfidious, cowardly, countless, and harassers more than fighters.³³ Rather than handing *virtus* to his soldiers through victory of a foe of appreciable *virtus* in their own right, Caesar (and Anonymous) instead create a narrative of endurance and leadership which overcomes other impressive obstacles in forms such as of trickery and sheer number, which deprive the enemy of any praise. Caesar was able to claim sufficient glory for his own soldiers in their victory while also establishing the Gauls and Germans as cultural and political ‘others’ whose lack of Romanity was itself a justification for conquering and assimilating them.³⁴

Anonymous takes this trope and molds it to fit his new agenda of painting the Numidians poorly by means of a surprising contrast. In the section above, Anonymous humanizes the Gauls and Germans, largely forgiving their role in the opposing army as non-ideological and driven by honorable, or at least reasonable intentions. Swearing an oath of loyalty to one’s conquering commander was standard procedure in Roman military practice. In the first example, the defeated Gauls and Germans are impressed by

³² The vignettes in *B. Afr.* 4, 28 and 45, for example.

³³ Riggsby 60-4, 98 on the Gauls’ negative attributes and the Germans as stereotypically nomadic in the *BG*; Rawlings 174-82 on the presented nature of Gallic warfare in particular.

³⁴ On barbarism of one’s enemy as part of the justification for war in Republican Rome, Riggsby 173-9 *passim*.

the utter authority (which must have implications of Roman noble superiority) of their conqueror, Labienus. Thus they are portrayed as followers of an ideology of Roman honor and it cannot be forgotten that the Roman army that they were so impressed by was technically Caesar's in Gaul, not Labienus'. Being a soldier for hire, as the second aforementioned group is, is a less attractive intention to hold, but Anonymous seems more interested in bringing it up to emphasize the manner of recruitment in the Pompeian army than to wag his finger at the Germanics. *Pretio pollicitationibus adducti* seems to place far more focus on Labienus' attempt to grow his army by greasing their palms than through a proper Roman levy. That the Pompeians are often forced to raise improper armies is a common theme throughout the *Bellum Africum*, as Labienus, Gnaeus Pompey and later Scipio all are said to have included slaves, freedmen, and lower class citizens into forced levies at various times.³⁵ Anonymous' regular apology, then, that Caesar's army is burdened with *tirones* with little experience in fact acts to remind the audience of Caesar's far greater insistence upon the use of truly Roman soldiers. At any rate, it is hard not to overlook the Gauls' and Germans' monetary interests when they so passionately stuck to their oaths to their leader.

The final group has sworn their life to Labienus in the aftermath of the defeat of their original leader, Curio, the Caesarian wiped out by Labienus in 49 BCE. Anonymous notes that they were prisoners of war following the defeat of Curio; without a leader to whom they were still sworn, they bound themselves to their new leader as a thanks for his

³⁵ Labienus does so at *B. Afr.* 19.3.12-4, Gnaeus at 23.1.5-6, Scipio makes the suggestion at 88.1.4-6.

mercy. We are clearly supposed to sympathize with their devotion, as Anonymous describes it quite positively: “they had wanted to exhibit equal gratitude in offering up their loyalty” (40.5.9: *parem gratiam in fide praebenda praestare voluerant*). Although some are mercenaries and the nature of their leaders in *De Bello Gallico* is not to be ignored, Anonymous presents the Gauls and Germans as part of “the good guys” by displaying them as men who follow the military code of honor. The ambushing and cowardly Numidians, along with their treacherous Pompeian leaders, are regularly viewed poorly against the Caesarians for the same reason throughout the *Bellum Africum*. It is a strong statement to so plainly set up a contrast in which the Numidians and the Pompeians are below even the Gauls and Germans in matters of honor and thus serves to push the Pompeians even further from a sense of Romanity.

Some would perhaps call the rhetoric of this digression overly subtle, but its very nature as an unnecessary and apocryphal digression alone implies that its meaning lies elsewhere than mere description. The themes that it establishes, furthermore, are brought to the forefront again, and with far greater directness, in another digression during the harassment of Caesar’s troops during his march towards Zeta in section 73. Having turned from annoyed to exhausted by the guerilla tactics and unusual (i.e., improper) harassments of the Numidian cavalry, Caesar is forced to switch into a slower tactic than he is accustomed in order to successfully counter their strategy of wearing him out.

As Anonymous explains, Caesar cannot expect to fight in the same fashion as he did in Gaul. Anonymous intervenes here with his authorial voice to declare this need for change unsurprising on his account: the decision was *nec mirum*, with the underlying

assumption that the author and every reader would understand what follows (*B. Afr.*

73.2.1). Anonymous then recalls the nature of the fighting back in Gaul:

copias enim habebat in Gallia bellare consuetas locis campestribus et contra Gallos homines apertos minimeque insidiosos, qui per virtutem, non per dolum dimicare consuerunt; tum autem erat ei laborandum ut consuefaceret milites hostium dolos insidias artificia cognoscere. (B. Afr. 73.2.1-5)

“For he had soldiers accustomed to fighting in Gaul in areas of open field and against the Gauls, upright men and not at all deceitful, who were accustomed to fight through *virtus*, not through trickery. At that time, however, he had to labor so that he could make his soldiers accustomed to notice the tricks, traps, and artifice of the enemy.”

This sketch of the Gauls is a generous representation compared to that given by Caesar in *De Bello Gallico*, but Anonymous has zoomed in purely on the manner of the fighting style of the average man and has given them high praise as men who fight war properly, battling man to man in prepared combat. *Virtus* is not a word used lightly in the *Bellum Africum*. Anonymous uses it eight times of humans (and once in a technical sense of the nature of elephants). Four of those times refer to the good *virtus* of Caesar’s soldiers, three of those times refer to the lack of *virtus* of Caesar’s enemies, and then this one reference to the Gauls.³⁶ To apply it, then, to the foreign enemy of Caesar in Gaul as a part of this contrast is to make a strong point about how great the gap of human quality there is between the Caesarians and Pompeians, and how it is that we should measure that gap. This is especially true if Anonymous and the reader both already have in mind the miserable portrayal of the Gauls and Germans in *De Bello Gallico*; it is stunning that they

³⁶ The *virtus* of Caesar’s soldiers: *B. Afr.* 45.5.4, 54.4.2, 81.1.10, 81.2.3, 84.1.1; of the enemy: 54.5.2 (dismissed officers), 79.1.5 (Pompeian army), 94.1.3 (Juba).

now deserve this level of praise in comparison to the Numidians. As in *De Bello Gallico*, Anonymous is setting up “levels of barbarization”.³⁷ In this case, Anonymous has set the Gauls above the Numidians according to the way in which they conduct war.

Beyond the fact that the endless presence of the Numidians as the driving force of battles for the Pompeians and the political link made between Juba and the Pompeians early in the work, Anonymous also links to the Numidians’ negative actions with the Pompeians by associating both with “new” battle tactics. These “new” tactics are not only a chance to display Caesar’s famed swiftness of mind in brilliantly countering the unexpected, but also, as here, is construed as improper and the marks of barbarism. We are told by Anonymous’ fugitive sources in *B. Afr.* 19.2.2-3 that Labienus met Caesar outside of Ruspina with the plan of trying out *novο atque inusitato genere proeli* on Caesar’s troops, rather than attempting to assure victory in a traditional and more assured manner. He expected that he could crush Caesar this way just as he had done to Curio, utterly swarming and exhausting the Caesarians with the sheer number of his Numidian cavalry. Of course, by this point the reader already knows that this is not the case, since Caesar has already overcome Labienus in this battle in *B. Afr.* 12-8. The extent of Labienus’ false assumption grows larger by allusion, as the first thing Caesar notices and reacts to at the start of the battle is *novο genere pugnae oblato*. Aislinn Melchior finds in this scene an inability of Labienus to learn the right things from the right *exempla* in his understanding of his defeat of Curio, thus demonstrating a disconnect with the

³⁷ On especially Caesar’s conscious distinction between the Gauls and Germans according to civilization and ‘distance from Romanity’, Riggsby 59-71.

appropriate Roman understanding of how one learns from the past.³⁸ It also re-enforces the idea that the Pompeians are disconnected from reality in general, a key component of dismissing their civil war rhetoric.

Furthermore, it emphasizes the foreign nature of the Pompeian military in Africa so often referenced throughout the *Bellum Africum*. Labienus does not merely command a thoroughly un-Roman army, mostly comprising oft-slandered Numidian cavalry, he has even adopted their foreign style in himself. Anonymous describes the battle strategy as *novo* (i.e., unfamiliar to any Roman commander) and the swarming, speeding attack is embodied in the style of his Numidian cavalry. Especially for a general such as Labienus, whom any Roman knows was a brilliant commander in Gaul, this kind of scene drives home the extent of his treachery against the Roman ideal and thus attaches his betrayal of Caesar to betrayal of the Roman state.

The alliance with Juba and the highly foreign army gave Anonymous unique fodder for his rhetoric over the other writers of the *Corpus Caesarianum* and often, as here, he takes full advantage of it. His lack of concern even for his own soldiers marks him again not so much as a Roman general but as a ruthless king or tyrant; the very crux of his plan was the calculated destruction of his own men in order to exhaust Caesar's soldiers through slaughter (*B. Afr.* 19.3.3-4: *ut etiam caedendo in ipsa victoria defatigati vincerentur*). Similarly, Juba wishes to massacre all of his own citizens at Zama should the war end in defeat for himself; the citizens of his own capital refuse him entry after his

³⁸ Melchior 246-8.

defeat and he commits suicide.³⁹ Upon hearing of Vaga's request to receive aid from Caesar, Juba not only secures the town for himself, but he slaughters every citizen to a man (*ad unum*).⁴⁰

Pompeian Delusion and the non-Civil War

It was not secret to Anonymous that the rhetorical program of the Pompeians, both at the time of the war and in his own time, largely mirrored Caesar's own claim to legitimacy of state. Instead of attempting to clash with the Pompeians on this issue in the vocabulary of civil war, Anonymous deftly re-casts the Pompeians as out of touch with reality in his depictions of the psychology and direct speech of his Pompeian characters.

Having established his simple and shameful strategy for the battle of *B. Afr.* 12-8, Labienus is shown spending his time in battle engaging in arrogance and treacherous denigration and alienation of his own former men. The entirety of *B. Afr.* 16 recounts a conversation between Labienus, one of the only leaders to abandon Caesar, and a veteran soldier of the 10th legion. When mocked as a mere recruit who has been fooled by Caesar's rhetoric and is now in trouble, the veteran's response answers solely to the insult of being a recruit. The insult burns the legionary as Labienus was not only a regular member of Caesar's Gallic campaigns in which the 10th legion also took part, but Caesar himself tells us that Labienus led the 10th to victory in battle at Sabis.⁴¹ The soldier is

³⁹ *B. Afr.* 91.2.3-9

⁴⁰ *B. Afr.* 74.2.3-8

⁴¹ *BG* 2.23

incensed that Labienus does not recognize him, but takes action when Labienus claims to not even recognize the banners of the 10th. At this point, the soldier takes off his helmet *ut cognosci ab eo posset* and spears Labienus' horse (*B. Afr.* 16.3.3). Labienus has disconnected himself from his Romanity on two levels: he has denied the pride and identity of a Roman veteran that he himself previously led into battle and willingly denied the status of a Roman legion.

Caesar, instead, is on the front lines, quickly noticing and adjusting to the strange tactics of his enemies. While Labienus is busy mocking Roman legionaries in *B. Afr.* 16, Caesar bookends him with careful attention and zealous orders in *B. Afr.* 15 and 17. When increased numbers (the only manner of aid on the Pompeian side) arrive in 17, Caesar counters with powerful exhortation to drive back the enemy in 18. It is the perfect timing of his final charge of cohorts that delivers victory for the heavily outnumbered Caesarians:

Itaque signo dato cum iam hostes languide tela neglegenterque mitterent, subito immitit cohortis turmasque suorum; atque puncto temporis hostibus nullo negotio campo pulsus post collemque deiectis nacti locum. (*B. Afr.* 18.5.1-4)

And thus he gave the sign just when the enemies were launching their spears weakly and carelessly, and immediately he sent on the cohorts and companies of his own men; and in an instant they drove the enemy from the field without struggle, routed them beyond the hill, and secured the location.

Caesar's ardent and brilliant leadership allowed him and the army to overcome the arrogance, mistakes, and foreignness of Labienus. This kind of behavior aligns Caesar with the traits of the traditional Roman general as an obvious counter to the actions of

Labienus.⁴² To drive home the point that this was not just a military victory, but indeed a clash of identities, Anonymous starts *B. Afr.* 19 by noting the high number of soldiers of all ranks that deserted to Caesar's camp in the aftermath of the battle.

In the vignette of *B. Afr.* 22-3, Cato attempts to rouse Gnaeus Pompey with an impassioned speech about his father. This shows that, if nothing else, Caesar's middle officers did not live in a complete propaganda bubble; Anonymous is able to piece together what looks more or less like a speech the famous Optimate might have given to young Pompey.

"Tuus", inquit, "pater istuc aetatis cum esset et animadvertisset rem publicam ab nefariis sceleratisque civibus oppressam bonosque aut interfectos aut exsilio multatos patria civitateque carere, gloria et animi magnitudine elatus privatus atque adulescentulus paterni exercitus reliquiis collectis paene oppressam funditus et deletam Italiam urbemque Romanam in libertatem vindicavit." (*B. Afr.* 22.2.1-8)

"When your father was your age and noticed that the Republic was oppressed by evil and criminal citizens and very many *boni* were being killed or, having been exiled, lacked their fatherland and citizenship, inspired by glory and his mighty spirit, though still a private citizen and just a young man, he collected up the remains of his father's army and he freed Italy and Rome though nearly entirely oppressed and destroyed."

Cato creates a parallel between Pompey Magnus' attacks upon Marius, Caesar's famous ancestor, in 83 BCE and Gnaeus' opportunity against Caesar in Africa. It is a seemingly clever comparison for Cato in order to ignite any conservative or anti-Caesarian, but the whole text tells a bigger story for Anonymous. Anonymous has set up the comparison of Marius and Pompey with Caesar and Gnaeus through Cato as a point of encouragement

⁴² On Caesar's buzzing around the front lines with orders (and most of his other famous traits) as usual within the traditional Roman framework for good generals, Goldsworthy (1998), pp. 204-211.

for the Pompeian side, but Anonymous quickly deconstructs the entire notion. Anonymous takes the Pompeian smearing of Marius head on; he directly references Marius thrice and every time is after this scene. All three occasions reference the local Africans' loyalty to Marius as a pretense for their continued loyalty to Caesar. By these points in the text (*B. Afr.* 32, 35, and 56), Anonymous has already established the legitimacy of the local (non-Numidian) Africans and the province of Africa as a whole. Through this triangle of connections between Caesar, Marius, and Africa, Anonymous is able to strengthen the image of all three via the positive actions of each towards the other. Cato's words ring hollow against the reality on the ground: the *actions* of Marius and Caesar have lead the Africans, legitimate provincials of the Romans, to long submit to the Caesarian cause as the bastion of freedom and safety.

Although there are plenty of buzzwords in Cato's exhortation (*res publica, boni, libertatem*), Cato does subtly admit that the freedom of the Republic is not Pompey's cause, but rather the result of his actions. His impetus, first and foremost, is glory (*gloria et animi magnitudine elatus*). This is a strong foil for Caesar in the *Bellum Africum*, where he is repeatedly driven on for the sake of the Republic, justice for the Africans, and the well-being of his soldiers. The end of Cato's speech represents the same kind of divisiveness that Grillo recognizes in Caesar's depiction of Pompey in *De Bello Civili*.⁴³ Cato finishes his request of Gnaeus by urging him to rally Pompey's clients for *tibi reique publicae atque optimo cuique*. The Republic stands in the weakest rhetorical

⁴³ Grillo 130-40, especially 135-6.

position of the three causes and finishing with specifically the Optimate faction, Cato seeks unnecessarily to politicize and divide the Republican cause. Cato has already signaled the political divide through his mention specifically of the *boni* previously in the speech. This contrasts greatly with Caesar, who comes off as the great Roman unifier in the *Bellum Africum*: he is backed up by a constant influx of deserters to his side, he passionately protects the local provincials, and he regularly sues for peace and diplomacy. There must be some irony to this, too, for Anonymous as the Pompeians praise Pompey Magnus for freeing the *boni* forced into exile and deprived of their citizenship after painting them as traitors who fled Rome willingly and gave up their citizenship voluntarily to be under the thumb of a foreign king.

Anonymous chooses to avoid the issue of Pompey's actions in the civil war by omitting them entirely from this speech, a continuation of the careful attention to handling the concept of civil war in the *Bellum Africum*. Anonymous continues to subtly undermine the Pompeian perspective in Gnaeus' response. In the same way that Pompey Magnus does the right thing but misses the point in acting for glory rather than the Republic, Gnaeus is driven on primarily by Cato's massive political authority, not the cause of the Republic (*B. Afr.* 23.1.1: *verbis hominis gravissimi incitatus*). By the end of *B. Afr.* 23, Gnaeus has already been soundly defeated at the hands of Caesar's ally King Bogud, a mockery both of Cato's grandeur and the legacy of Pompey's actions against Marius in Italy as well as in Africa. Even Cato is aware that things are not as they used to be; the juxtaposition of Pompey Magnus' *animi magnitudine elatus* with Cato's description of Gnaeus as only *satis animi magnitudine praeditus* is hard to ignore.

Whatever the combination of Cato's lack of power amongst the Pompeians and their general lack of faith in the young Pompey, he is forced to rally a group of the lowest classes of society (*B. Afr.* 23.1.5-6: *expeditoque exercitu numero servorum liberorum i milium*). While Anonymous tiptoes around the legacies of Cato and Pompey Magnus, figures whose reputations were too universally positive to blatantly deface (even Caesar failed to drag Cato into infamy), Gnaeus and Scipio were easy targets.⁴⁴

Instead, Cato's positive image is turned against the Pompeians, as he represents a guardian of a former cause no longer embodied by the rest of the Pompeians. Cato's authenticity in his exhortation of Gnaeus is rendered tragic in Gnaeus' complete and immediate failure and cowardice in fleeing to the Balearic Islands. Cato reappears in *B. Afr.* 87, as he desperately attempts to keep Utica in check after Caesar's victory at Thapsus. Realizing that previous favors by Caesar during his time as Consul had rendered Utica's citizens as ambivalent in the struggle, Cato kicked the plebs out of Utica and re-enforced the rest of the city (*B. Afr.* 87.3.3). Here again, Cato very much sees a political civil war and seeks to divide (in this case literally) Romans according to class and political ideology. When the disgruntled cavalry of Scipio arrive at Utica's gates to loot it, Cato is unable to persuade them to stop, a sign of his waning sway in the Pompeian camp. Nevertheless, he spares the citizens of Utica by paying off the cavalry. When Scipio and his 300 elite supporters arrive at Utica, Cato is nowhere in the picture of Scipio's unpopular leadership. Instead, immediately after this interruption to describe

⁴⁴ On Caesar's animosity towards Cato and his invective the *Anticato*, Goldsworthy (2006) 487-9.

Scipio's arrival, Cato commits suicide. The people of Utica, even though they hated his politics (*B. Afr.* 88.5.2-3: *quamquam oderant partium gratia*), granted him a burial because he had been a unique leader (*quod disimillimus reliquorum ducum fuerat*). This scene both confirms Cato's generally good image but also serves to emphasize the genuine Caesarian interest in unity against the Pompeians' partisanship. It also re-iterates the idea that Cato (and his rare good image) was unique amongst the Pompeians for his integrity and his authentic loyalty to the people of his city.

Thus Anonymous, at least in terms of dealing with Cato, for once outdoes his leader Caesar; instead of attempting to bring Cato down, Anonymous crafts him as a pariah amongst the remaining unworthy Pompeian leaders. Anonymous has a particular interest with loyalty to the Republic as a concept proved through actions, and in no way then could he discredit Cato. Instead, he bolstered his own image and strengthened the notion of Caesarian unity through his acceptance of Cato's good intentions while further alienating the other Pompeians from the prescribed Roman value set. Likewise, Pompey exists within the *Bellum Africum* only within the words of the disregarded Cato. By the time of the *Bellum Africum*, one is dead and the other is irrelevant, and by the time of the work's publishing, they are both long out of the picture. In writing this work, then, Anonymous needed not to compare Caesar to Pompey or Cato, he only needed to prove that they were not an important part of the discussion. From top to bottom, the actual leaders of the Pompeian movement at the time were nothing like their legendary former champions. In creating such a disconnection, Anonymous gave himself the much easier

job of lining Caesar up against Scipio and Labienus, which he has done prominently throughout the work.

Anonymous' Portrayal of Caesar

Anonymous is clearly aware of how Caesar presented himself in his propaganda, either through hearing or reading (most likely both) a large amount of it. Part of the way that Anonymous legitimizes his text is in anchoring his own portrayal of Caesar in much the same fashion: Caesar is swift, quick-witted, merciful, and lucky. Anonymous has little interest in vastly reforming the character of Caesar, but he does often focus on different aspects of these traits than Caesar did. He legitimizes Caesar's status as the Roman in this war by showing his adherence to proper Roman procedure and genuine self sacrifice for the state. He also highlights the pragmatic nature of Caesar's *clementia* to downplay the Pompeians' reasons for war and to paint Caesar's mercy not just as morally good, but useful for political leadership. Anonymous' mixed approach to Caesar as self-styled Republican politician and as his own military leader, however, occasionally leads him to blur the line between Caesar as servant of the state and Caesar as the sole answer to fix and preserve the state; this hazy figure of Caesar as a one-man solution for the Republic's ills may be a window into Caesarian rhetoric regarding the latter years of Caesar's political control of Rome.

Caesar: Republic's Servant or Savior?

Anonymous seizes an opportunity to draw a sharp contrast of Roman loyalty during Caesar's time at Leptis soon after landing in *B. Afr.* 7. That Leptis is welcoming of Caesar's arrival in Africa and eager to help him allows the author to remark upon Leptis'

free status in Roman law—a status it gained for its loyalty to Rome during the Punic Wars.⁴⁵ This serves little purpose for the military narrative, but hints that Leptis repeated its history in choosing to reject its native state in favor of loyalty to the state of Rome—embodied in Caesar (*B. Afr.* 7.1.2). Though it is not mentioned in the narrative itself, it is hard to believe that mention of the town, with its special status explicitly stated here, did not predominantly evoke that memory. The only other free-state mentioned in *Bellum Africum*, Acylla, received its benefits the same way, and likewise is noted to have enthusiastically supported the cause of Caesar (*B. Afr.* 33.1.1-2). Historically, pragmatically, and ideologically, these towns had strong reasons to stay in the good graces of what they deemed to be the Roman state.

Once he has re-enforced the point that Africa as a province deserves the proper protection of the Roman state, Anonymous is then able to rely on tropes similar to those Caesar uses against Scipio and the Pompeians in their tyrannizing of the eastern provinces in *De Bello Civili*. The injustice is heightened by the implication that these “Romans” are abusing other Romans in obedience to a foreign king. Beyond the above passage which describes the Pompeians as voluntary turncoat *vectigales* of King Juba, the type of assault on citizens conferred upon the Pompeians mirrors such ruthlessness in King Juba upon his own citizens and upon Romans in the text.⁴⁶ This cruelty is the highest form of treachery and the most humiliating form of assault upon the Roman state.

⁴⁵ Way 154.

⁴⁶ At *B. Afr.* 74.2.3-8, Juba’s unnecessary slaughter of the citizens of Vaga. At *B. Afr.* 91.2.3-9, Juba’s attempted massacre of his own capital citizens.

In *B. Afr.* 26, Anonymous is to legitimize Caesar's hasty actions in the winter of 47/6 by expanding upon the injustices done by the 'foreign' Pompeians against the provincial Africans. After Caesar sends out announcements informing the locals that he himself has landed in Africa, nobles from many towns quickly arrive at Caesar's camp to beg for assistance against the cruelties of Scipio's forces. His concern for their plight was such that, despite the difficulty his fleets just had getting across the sea, he switched to a winter campaign and demanded that the rest of his forces arrive as soon as possible regardless of adverse conditions. Anonymous paints a visibly shaken and frustrated Caesar (*B. Afr.* 26.3.1-2: *quorum lacrimis querelisque Caesar commotus*), who expects the fleets to arrive less than a day after he sends the letter and can be seen constantly focusing on the sea. The protection of the province is certainly a familiar Caesarian virtue, but the increased danger of a winter campaign in what is already a lop-sided affair is beyond daring and was likely to create anxiety and displeasure within Caesar's camp. Nevertheless, Anonymous says of Caesar's impatience and determination to immediately cease these wrongs that it was *nec mirum*. This narrator intervention gives the sense that this is the 'natural' position both for a man such as Caesar and a man such as himself (i.e., a 44/3 BCE Caesarian).⁴⁷ He was not surprised by Caesar's reaction since, as Anonymous relates in full, Caesar was forced to notice the burning of farms, the destruction of fields, the plundering of livestock, the butchering of men, full towns and forts destroyed, town leaders killed or chained, and children sold into slavery. Worst of

⁴⁷ For a point of contrast within Caesar's own work, Riggsby 150-6 analyzes the nature of the narrator in *De Bello Gallico*.

all, “he was unable to be of any help on account of his scarcity of troops for those miserable people pleading for a promise of protection” (*B. Afr.* 26.5.6-7: *eis se miseris suamque fidem implorantibus auxilio propter copiarum paucitatem esse non posse*).

After the long list of injuries against the African people, Anonymous uses Caesar’s call for recruits to re-iterate his larger point. In sending out letters in request of aid, Caesar tells his associates in Sicily: “Nothing beyond the very soil of Africa will remain unless there is soon some protection to which they may retreat from the crime and ambushes of those men” (*B. Afr.* 26.3.11-4.1: *praeter ipsam Africam terram nihil ne tectum quidem quo se reciperent ab eorum scelere insidiisque reliquum futurum*). Caesar is driven by an inherent disgust for the uncivilized and ruthless nature of Scipio’s forces, especially Africa is a Roman province under the protection of the Republic. Beyond any sense of dignity attached to protecting its own peoples, Anonymous calls again upon the idea that when the Pompeians gain from their abuse of Africa, the Romans lose money and resources; if Caesar does not act soon, all of the Romans’ previous sacrifice to establish Africa will have been for naught. The use of *insidiis* to describe Scipio’s actions is a sort of dog whistle, equating his stratagem with the most common one ascribed to the Numidians (that of ambush).

While the change is not overwhelming, Anonymous’ portrayal of Caesar is notably different from Caesar’s own in the approach to Caesar’s connection to religious practice and the divine. Caesar is saved an entire garrison in *B. Afr.* 74 when a deserter from Vaga shows up to interrupt the Vaga legates’ plea for assistance from Caesar. (*B.*

Afr. 74.2.1-2: *deorum voluntate studioque erga Caesarem transfuga suos civis facit certiores*). He informs them that Juba has ruthlessly destroyed the town and that sending a garrison there would be a disaster. Doubtlessly, this is a dramatic day at the camp, as the legates must learn of this horrible news just as they think they are about to receive their salvation. Moreover, this is a fairly rare reference to the divine in the *Corpus Caesarianum*, and an extremely rare one to connect the divine to Caesar.

Anonymous notes that the gods' favor is *erga Caesarem*, not something like *erga rem publicam*, such as, for example, in Cato the Younger's *oratio* fragment 64.1.1. Caesar does not completely shy away from divine influence in his own work, but he is incredibly careful about the way in which he works with them, almost all of which clash with the bold nature of this passage by Anonymous. When Caesar ponders on a lucky happenstance early in *De Bello Gallico*, he notes that the Helvetii get their just deserts for their injustice towards the Roman people first "either by luck or by the plan of the immortal gods" (*BG* 1.12.6.1-2: *sive casu sive consilio deorum immortalium*), thus weakening his attachment to the sentiment. He is also careful to note that the gods act on behalf of the entire Roman people, and not for his own sake (*BG* 1.12.6.3: *quae...calamitatem populo Romano intulerat, ea princeps poenam persolvit*). Again, Caesar's reference to the gods two sections later in his response to the Helvetii speaks to a vague universal moral system and is almost proverbial in nature, when he tells them that the gods often grant temporary success to the wicked, purely so that they may fall all the harder (*BG* 1.14.5). The gods get only eight other mentions in the entire corpus of Caesar's own writings and none of them make any connection at all between Caesar and

the gods, save for a speech given with the purpose of rousing his troops which, once again, only implies their goodwill towards the soldiers, not himself (*BG* 5.52.6.3). Thus such a divine spotlight as this seeming throwaway phrase casts upon Caesar is in fact incredibly out of place for standard Caesarian rhetoric.

Caesar often gets out of difficult situations in the whole of the *Corpus Caesarianum* (especially in the Continuator) through pure luck. Here, near the end of the work, a mention of the gods' good will towards Caesar dramatically spares him from his own inherent drive to help down-trodden people (a handy explanation for his unusual rejection of their pleas) and foreshadows the upcoming battle at Thapsus, whose outcome is already well known by Anonymous. Furthermore, by 42 BCE Octavian has successfully established Caesar's apotheosis and divinity; that Caesarians were already preparing that mythos in 44/43 makes greater sense of these sorts of passages here and in the texts of the Continuator than the assumption that the Continuator was covering up for a lack of knowledge or were simpler men who could not comprehend that the divine was not traditionally part of Caesar's propaganda.

The passage is contested, as the *D'* tradition reads *de eorum*, rather than *deorum*, as the *β* tradition reads. *De eorum* reads considerably more weakly, which likely explains its retention by Du Pontet, Bouvet, and Way (although Du Pontet marks it with daggers). In that case, the deserter speaks up about the situation at Vaga due to the will and zeal towards Caesar that he senses in the legates or their countrymen. This makes little sense given that the information spares Caesar's troops and informs Caesar's next action more

than it helps any of the citizens of Vaga. Beyond that, there is no good explanation for why such a clause would start with *de*; *de sua voluntate* often means “of one’s own free will”, but “through the free will and zeal of them” does not seem to reasonably explain the deserter’s actions. It does, however, leave an opening for the assumption of mistake (i.e, that *deorum voluntate* must in fact be a mistake from the idiomatic *de eorum voluntate*) and *deorum* begs to be erased on the grounds that such a reference to the gods is “non-Caesarian”, but the Continuators are quite notably *not* Caesar. Paul Murphy’s analysis of the nature of Caesarian *felicitas* in the Continuators does not go quite so far, but does demonstrate the considerable increase in interest in Caesar as a recipient of special favor in the Continuators.⁴⁸ Caesar begins the decisive Battle of Thapsus, which has been dramatically built up by the anxiety of the troops to begin the charge, with “the sign of *Felicitas*” (*B. Afr.* 83.1.2-3: *signo Felicitatis dato*). The signal foreshadows Caesar’s ultimate victory in the battle, but also makes a personal connection between Caesar, who feels vested with the power to make the signal, and a kind of *Felicitas* that does not merely explain good luck in retrospect, but can be called upon at the outset of battle to turn the tide for him. Reading *deorum* also makes more sense out of the beginning of the following section, which mentions the exact date (presumably the day of or immediately after) on which Caesar ceremoniously purified his army (*B. Afr.* 75.1.1-2: *lustrato exercitu a. d. xii Kal. April*). The only other mention of Caesar performing a religious act is following the battle of Thapsus, in which Caesar performs some sort of

⁴⁸ On the considerably different, more vague, and heavy handed *felicitas* of the Continuators, Murphy 307-17. He does not discuss this passage in particular.

sacrifice or other religious act of thanks before the celebratory ceremony to honor the troops for their victory (*B. Afr.* 86.3.3: *divina re facta*). In both cases, Caesar responds to the goodwill of the gods with a religious ceremony. To be clear, the lustration of the army was not itself a reaction to any particular event. The lustration usually accompanied a thorough review of the army for organizational purposes and such a review would be fitting before Caesar takes up the march again with his full forces towards the conclusion of the war (Anonymous has likely pulled that exact date from an official report that the act was carried out). Even still, such a purification is never mentioned in Caesar's own texts. Therefore, such a bundling of the two religious moments together (the gods' favor sparing one course of action and Caesar's religious preparation for the final course of action) was perhaps quite on purpose. All things considered, myself and both of the most recent editions of the text, Way's and Bouvet's, accept the reading *deorum*.

Battles are turned and armies are saved because Caesar specifically has been granted the will of the gods, and zealously so (*studioque*). If Caesar is indeed already dead by the writing of the *Bellum Africum*, references to divine favor upon Caesar seem especially apt. The enemy, logically, has lost the favor of the gods, outcasts of the Roman pantheon and therefore outcasts of Romanity. This finishes the implication from *B. Afr.* 7 and 57, in which Caesar pities the delusion of men who are willing take up servitude of a king and reject the benefits (and therefore the status itself) of Roman citizenship; these leaders and their men, if they were Romans before, are political and religious *personae non gratae*.

Caesar's *clementia* as Primarily Pragmatic

B. Afr. 64 serves as an opportunity for comparison of the justice system of each faction. Every Pompeian capture has led to tyrannical execution, often due to perceived insolence.⁴⁹ Speaking to a community seeking a new leader and reflecting on Caesar's recent political affairs in Rome, it is important to Anonymous to show that the Pompeians rule wrongly, unpredictably, and inefficiently. Part of doing so is setting up Caesar's system of justice as its foil. Here, Caesar captures the knight Publius Vestrius and Publius Ligarius, a man Caesar has already pardoned once in Spain but who immediately joined Pompey and after his defeat fled to Varus. Caesar makes the rare decision to execute Publius Ligarius *ob periurium perfidiamque*. This rather terse execution sticks out both within *Bellum Africum* and within the *Corpus Caesarianum* as a whole. As Luca Grillo demonstrates in his consideration of *De Bello Civili*, Caesar's *clementia* is "limitless" upon first transgression; even in situations where the only argument for mercy is his own image, Caesar yields to his transgressors.⁵⁰ At Ilerda, this decision towards *miser cordia* over execution is a point of particular displeasure with his army.⁵¹ Execution, then, is a serious course of action, especially since it threatens to connect Caesar's actions to those of the Pompeians. Caesar's *clementia* is also pragmatic, and the second pardoning of Ligarius leaves Caesar with little to gain. Ligarius is implied to be of little political

⁴⁹ *B. Afr.* 4.4; 28.2-4; 46.1-3; 74.2

⁵⁰ Grillo pp. 78-94 investigates the extent and dangers of Caesar's *clementia* through the treachery of Afranius at Ilerda and of the townsfolk at Masilia during the first Spanish campaign.

⁵¹ Grillo 93.

importance, given no title against Vestrius' *eques Romanus*. He is also a relentless oath breaker, as emphasized by the double noun *periurium perfidiamque*. He not only 'rewards' Caesar for his leniency in the defeat of Afranius by immediately joining Pompey; after Pharsalus he allies himself to Varus in Africa. This work is particularly interested in the nature of loyalty for officers and soldiers alike. A group of Germans, mentioned previously, are not condescended for their allegiance to Labienus due to his kindness towards them and Vestrius himself is able to explain away why he was in the Pompeian camp. Ligarius has not only turned his back on the man who spared him, but also regularly flees to new leaders on the enemy side after the defeat of his former boss. He has had multiple opportunities to see accept the best option and join the Caesarian camp (a type of 'loyalty' that Caesar finds at least acceptable).⁵²

What has Rome to gain from an officer such as this, who has been so treacherous to Caesar not only as the man who spared him, but also as the champion of the prevailing Roman cause? His repeated refusal to accept Caesar's mercy and his constant rejection of his conquering leader is tantamount to oath breaking and here again an enemy is framed as a rejecter of Roman ideals, especially since the strength of the military oath is the very foundation of the Roman army. I am not convinced that Caesar would have presented this scene so bluntly, or frankly at all. As a single man of no import, Caesar does not seem to gain by undermining his image of *clementia* in order to accurately record the capture of two middling officers (Caesar does, for instance, reject Afranius' call for mercy after the

⁵² Beyond Vestrius in this passage, see also Caesar's willingness to allow Salienus back to the war in *B. Afr.* 28 and the endless flow of deserters accepted without qualification throughout the work *passim*.

battle of Ilerda on the grounds that his treachery, power, and rank were overwhelming). For Anonymous, however, such a scene plays into his larger point of exploring proper Romanity in the framework of military and political responsibilities and the importance of pragmatic mercy. Ligarius is entirely useless to the Roman cause in his low rank and thoroughly perfidious nature, fickle in his loyalties, disregarding of his oaths, and interested in personal gain over unity of the Roman state.

Caesar does choose, however, to pardon Vestrius. Of the two captured men, only Vestrius is a Roman knight; Ligarius is merely described as a former supporter of Afranius. Furthermore, Vestrius' brother pays a stipulated ransom from Rome. These two reasons give Caesar more than enough cause to pardon Vestrius on the grounds of pragmatism; he only stands to gain politically and economically. Beyond that, Caesar accepts Vestrius' explanation that he had joined the Pompeians due to the fact that Varus had pardoned him from execution and was thus serving him until he was given a new opportunity to return to Caesar's side. Caesar accepts this argument as both genuine and sufficient and thus frees him. Caesar's leniency is not merely admirable *per se*; it is pragmatic and, in a sense, selfish in a way that makes it believable and acceptable even to his opponents.

As we can see by his having to pay a fine, however, this behavior by Vestrius stands only as acceptable, rather than commendable. Titus Salienus is scorned for his immediate surrender to Vergilius on the promise of mercy in *B. Afr.* 28, a decision which will lead to his death at the treacherous Pompeian's hands. A Caesarian legionary is commended, on the other hand, for his rejection of his captor Scipio's offer of mercy and

payment in *B. Afr.* 44-6. The text, then, is seemingly contradictory, commending Caesar's troops for their utter loyalty to their oaths to Caesar while also framing both of these prisoners by their willingness to switch sides. Anonymous has already made the case, however, that the Pompeians are not truly Romans, and thus the breaking of one's foreign oaths to join the Roman cause is easily dismissed. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, military oaths can only be overwritten after defeat of one's leader; thus, Ligarius is expected to accept Caesar, while the centurion of *B. Afr.* 44-6 should not.⁵³ Grillo has also shown that Caesar himself in *De Bello Civili* distinguishes the types of individual oaths that he makes his soldiers swear as more proper than the mass oaths sworn by the Pompeian side.⁵⁴ In this way, the breaking of the Pompeian oaths may be seen as more trifling. At the least, it explains the centurion of *B. Afr.* 44-6's more steadfast connection to his oaths, having a more personal connection to the ceremony.

The Battle of Thapsus

B. Afr. 85 may be the most emotionally powerful scene in the *Bellum Africum*, but it also encapsulates most of the key themes of the work, especially regarding the portrayal of Caesar. After months of frustratingly harsh conditions and guerilla warfare, Caesar and his men handily defeat Scipio at the Battle of Thapsus. Having already discarded their armor in their retreat, the Pompeian soldiers can find no camp or leader left uncaptured and thus lower their arms and give the military salute of surrender (*B. Afr.*

⁵³ Gracia pp. 84-6.

⁵⁴ Grillo 58-66.

85.5.2-4). Anonymous and Caesar are both of the expected opinion that this surrender should be granted as part of the honorable rules of war; Anonymous specifically mentions that the Pompeian troops act *more militari* (B. Afr. 85.5.4). Caesar's soldiers, on the other hand, have had enough of their enemy and reject the Pompeians' surrender. Anonymous notes quite on purpose that it is the *milites veterani*, not foreigners or recruits, who, inflamed with pain and anger, looked to slaughter the entirety of Scipio's army.

It is at this point that this scene becomes especially complex and completely unique. Caesar's soldiers are so completely blinded by their rage that they even turn on their commanders who plead with them to spare the Pompeians:

Namque milites veterani ira et dolore incensi non modo ut parcerent hosti non poterant adduci, sed etiam ex suo exercitu inlustri urbanos, quos auctores <...> appellabant, compluris aut vulerunt aut interfecerunt...quo facto complures equites Romani senatoresque perterriti ex proelio se receperunt. (B. Afr. 85.6.1-7.1, 8.1-3)

For the veteran soldiers were so incensed by wrath and pain that not only were they unable to be convinced to spare the enemy, but even many illustrious men of rank from their own army, whom they called *auctores* <...>, they either wounded or killed...for that reason many Roman knights and senators were completely frightened and retired from the battle.

Although Caesar is often unable to fully control his troops in the Continuators, a sort of flaw that can often be overlooked as a reality of army life or serve as an excuse to show Caesar's ability to overcome an obstacle, never has his army so wrathfully turned

against their own commanders.⁵⁵ The soldiers even override Caesar himself, who begs his men to spare the Pompeians, but nevertheless must watch his soldiers gruesomely massacre them to a man (*B. Afr.* 85.9.1-3: *inspectante ipso Caesare et a militibus deprecante eis uti parcerent, ad unum sunt interfecti.*) There is no sense of gleeful revenge in Anonymous' words, but rather a sense of horror, disgust, and disappointment. Beyond his pleading for the recognition of the signs of surrender, Caesar is the safety of his commander Pompeius Rufus, who by clinging to Caesar's arm is spared his death; thus, he demonstrates two-fold devotion to protection of military procedure. The metaphor is powerful: while the other nobles flee the field, Caesar is the literal, physical savior of a noble's life in the face of military danger and despite the aggressor being his own partisans.

Regarding the highly unusual claim by the soldiers that their own officers are *auctores*, Kubler suggests a lacuna of a word such as *belli*.⁵⁶ If this is so, Anonymous is painting Caesar as in the middle of a class and ideological battle between the elites and his own lower class democrats. Caesar's defense of the nobles re-iterates his insistence upon proper respect of hierarchy and battle procedure, but also shows Caesar as a more complex political figure with sympathies for the upper class and awareness of their importance in the running of operations at home and abroad. Even in their hot-blooded frenzy, the soldiers knew well not to attack a man touching Caesar for protection.

⁵⁵ On the soldierly misconduct as more common in the Continuators, Cluett (2009) 518.

⁵⁶ du Pontet's n.24 on *B. Afr.* 85.6

The scene allows for the most colorful elevation of Caesar as a Republican and a unifier, but its vivid description of the veteran Caesarians' disgraceful action and its clear tone of remorse and shame may well have left it on the cutting room floor had Hirtius gotten a chance to edit it. Beyond the powerful scenes of Caesar helplessly watching the executions and commanding officers clinging to the general's arm for their lives, Anonymous demonizes the veterans also for their arrogance: he assumes that the soldiers acted thus on the grounds that their victory would grant them forgiveness (*B. Afr.* 85.8.3-5: *ex tanta victoria licentiam sibi assumpsissent immoderate peccandi impunitatis spe*). It is a confusing and conflicting scene for Anonymous who clearly feels for his soldiers, noting their long-suffered *dolore*, but maintains his belief in Caesar's ideology and thus reprimands the soldiers for their butchery and disregard both for terms of surrender and for the orders of their commanders. At this most crucial moment of victory for Caesar and his men, their lack of discipline threatens to dismantle the very foundation of Caesar's image and approach.

Nevertheless, Anonymous felt the need to include this scene in all of its ugly reality. Certainly such an incredible scene would have been cause for rampant rumor and Anonymous is likely forced by that fact to at least mention it. Yet he goes to unnecessary lengths to paint the full portrait of the shameful event. Anonymous has repeatedly shown his intention to stick to the Caesarian rhetorical program and his partisan loyalty is unquestioned; he must have deemed that this passage added more to Caesar's image in its current state than it would have through omission. By separating the soldiers so starkly from the leadership, Anonymous has allowed himself to have it both ways: he can

emphasize the passion of Caesar's veterans as enduring conquerors of traitors and of those so often depicted as alien to and hateful of the Roman way, while also confirming Caesar's commitment to *clementia*, unity, and Roman hierarchy and procedure. This war has been hell for Caesar's veterans: in unfamiliar territory, they have been regularly outnumbered and often lacking in food and supplies; some have been on campaign for a decade and now have been tracked through the desert by men and commanders who used to be their brothers; the guerilla tactics and exotic animals have made battle frustrating; and royal garrisons of the king cast shadows upon their opponent's Roman banners. There would be a temptation in every Roman (or so Anonymous would hope) to sympathize with Roman veterans placed under such conditions. In starting with the *ira et dolore* of the soldiers, Anonymous allows the reader to connect with the raw emotion of the veterans while also separating their deeds as unacceptable.

It is not Caesar alone who is pleading for recognition of surrender and mercy, but all of his commanders as well. Caesar's leadership is on the same page in upholding Roman military law in the same way that the whole of the Pompeian command system has previously seemed so united in their tyranny. These commanders are respected members of the Roman community, *inlustris urbanos*, a phrasing which, while praising the men as Roman nobles, almost goes out of its way to not use *bonos*. The idea that Caesar's camp is well supported by proper Romans is again emphasized as specifically Roman knights and senators alike flee the field in fear. Anonymous invokes horror in the audience by describing the death of the ex-quaestor Tullius Rufus by spear only to immediately mention Caesar's personal protection of Pompeius Rufus, who was spared

only by virtue of his clinging to Caesar's side. Even the Pompeians seem to believe in Caesar's *clementia*, as they beg and plead with him to help spare their lives. Just as he had reacted to the Africans' plea for help from this very army with zeal, thus Caesar pleads with his men to spare that same army, only to every man be butchered.

In the passage immediately following the battle of Thapsus, Anonymous re-enforces his point by describing Caesar's attempt to peacefully negotiate the end of the siege of Thapsus itself. Caesar first lines up and displays his success before the town specifically in the hopes that it would lead the Pompeian commander Vergilius to surrender the town peacefully. He then appeals personally to Vergilius, reminding him of his leniency and clemency (*B. Afr.* 86.2.2-3.1: *suamque lenitatem et clementiam commemoravit*). This offer of mercy to Vergilius recalls *B. Afr.* 28, wherein formerly mutinous fifth legion centurion Titus Salienus chooses the promise of Vergilius' *clementia* over that of Caesar's. When captured by Vergilius, Salienus is overwhelmed by *conscientiam peccatorum suorum* and convinces the young Spaniards to surrender without a fight (*B. Afr.* 28.3.2). The scene seems to imply that Salienus could not bear to face his forgiving commander and thus chose a cowardly surrender to the enemy. In that scene, Vergilius reneges on his promise and murders Salienus and two young tribunes. In recalling the scene, Anonymous gives greater power to Caesar's show of mercy towards the untrustworthy Vergilius, but also presents an *exemplum* for Caesar and his soldiers to follow. Had Salienus trusted in Caesar's mercy and fought against Vergilius in order to return to Caesar, they would still be alive.

Caesar and the veteran soldiers need to trust each other in the giving and receiving of mercy in order to most effectively move forward with their command. In stark contrast to the rage of his soldiers, when Caesar's appeal to Vergilius fails, he simply withdraws, mirroring his diplomatic approach from the very beginning of the work at Hadrumetum and emphasizing the general's consistency regardless of the current state of affairs. The assumption Anonymous gives to the soldiery that success will breed impunity turns out to be correct, as we are given no scene of punishment for the veteran soldiers, but instead they are treated to full decoration in *B. Afr.* 86. After so many examples of Caesar's leniency towards others shown throughout the entire corpus, it is entirely unsurprising that he likewise shows it towards his own veterans in the wake of their greatest victory.

That Caesar's soldiers seem to be taking advantage of his leniency only strengthens the claim of Caesar's near-limitless commitment to pragmatic mercy and forgiveness. Regardless of the feelings of Caesar or his commanders towards their actions, it only hampers his cause at the moment of victory to insist upon disciplining such decorated and loyal men at this moment. Anonymous then relays that the next day Caesar offered appropriate sacrifice and decorated and paraded his army for their valor, thus fulfilling standard process before withdrawing from Thapsus and continuing with the war effort. Anonymous seems particularly interested in re-establishing Caesar's clemency and commitment to proper Roman procedure in the wake of the Battle of Thapsus. It allows him to connect those virtues with the victory itself, but it also firms up the rightness of Caesar's actions following the complex aftermath of the battle.

Conclusion: The 'Voice' of Anonymous and its Value

In 44 BCE, Roman politics fell into a state of chaos: in losing Julius Caesar, the opportunity to move government in a new direction was revealed, but the demand for a solution to the power vacuum left little time for leaders to reflect on Caesar's policies and little interest in doing so objectively. In taking up the project of completing the history of Caesar's wars, Aulus Hirtius looked to codify Caesar's legacy, justify his actions, and thereby prepare a path forward for the Caesarians to succeed Caesar as the main power in Roman politics. Indeed, it was his staunch new alliance to the young Octavian that ultimately brought on his untimely death. When Hirtius gave over his project to men such as Anonymous, he unknowingly presented us with a unique look into thoughts of an otherwise silent group: the less elite Caesarian partisans that made up the foundation of Caesar's power. This is true of all three of the Continuator's texts within the *Corpus Caesarianum*, *Bellum Alexandrinum*, *Bellum Africum*, and *Bellum Hispaniense*. The *Bellum Africum* is unique, however, in that, unlike the *Alexandrinum*, The *Bellum Africum* is written by someone outside of the very upper echelon of Caesar's retinue and is separated from the editing process (the *Alexandrinum* having been written at least partially by Aulus Hirtius); it was also written entirely by one person, which Gaertner has argued convincingly is unlikely of the *Alexandrinum*. Its textual integrity is also at least acceptably serviceable, something that certainly cannot be said for the *Hispaniense*.⁵⁷ The *Hispaniense*'s manuscript tradition is so thoroughly corrupted that it is difficult to

⁵⁷ Cluett (2009) 507-8.

confidently analyze on a full-scale stylistic or rhetorical level. This leaves the *Bellum Africum* as the most valuable text for an exercise such as this one, which seeks to better understand what the vision of Caesar and the idea of effective propaganda on his behalf might have looked like to the larger collection of Caesarian partisans in the years immediately following their leader's death.

It is Anonymous' most natural and primary goal to elevate the character and actions of Caesar during the African War. Years on campaign living solely under his general has clearly tinted Anonymous' view of leadership. Throughout the text, he justifies Caesar's power through his commitment to the highly formal procedure of the Roman army, presenting it as a mark of honesty, dignity, and loyalty. He sees Caesar's *clementia* not merely as a morally good trait, but as particularly a conscious point of effectiveness in leadership; Caesar forgives when it is valuable to himself or the state, maintains order without resentment through reasonable punishment, but is not afraid to ultimately revoke his mercy when it is no longer of use. Lastly, his dramatic portrayals of Caesar's emotional devotion to the protection of nobles and peasants alike and his willingness to more openly connect Caesar with divine action subtly aid the notion that Caesar is a leader in whom unusual power can (and perhaps should) be invested. Anonymous does not merely want to generally praise Caesar, but he paints Caesar as particularly fit to rule and command people.

This is only a two faction battle and Anonymous uses that fact to great effect in his justification of Caesar as ruler: rather than just proving that Caesar is unusually fit to

rule, Anonymous spends a great deal of his effort towards proving that all other options are unacceptable. Thus, he subverts the issue of civil war by alienating the Pompeians as non-Roman through their subservience to Juba and their foreign political and military tactics. He softens critique of Caesar via comparison by creating a personality and temporal divide between Caesar's old opponents, the legends of the Optimate cause (such as Pompey Magnus and Cato), and his contemporary opponents, the inferior Pompeian leaders of the African War. He also clarifies and simplifies the perception of the Caesarian faction by making Caesar the only major personality within his army; on the other hand, the Pompeian leadership is made up of tens of names, many of who appear only to prove their unworthiness and then vanish again into the confused Pompeian hierarchy. In these ways, Anonymous escapes the grander theoretical question of whether Caesar's style of rule is absolutely optimal by cutting away all possible competitors and leaving Caesar standing far above his actual opponents of the time. Thus, Anonymous does not leave his own reader wondering if the Caesarian way is the best; he leaves his reader doubtful that anyone else left could do better.

It has been my hope with this renewed investigation not just to defend Anonymous as a competent recorder or copyist, but to show that Anonymous has his own voice, one preserved by historical happenstance. Once it has been proven that Anonymous himself 'speaks' in *Bellum Africum*, his perspective can be sought out in the text and mined; such inquiries could lead to a better understanding of the political atmosphere in the aftermath of the death of Caesar, which is one of the most critical moments in Roman history. I have attempted to begin that search and analysis here in the

hopes that others after me will refine my method, contest my readings, compare Anonymous to a larger set of sources, and investigate the many instances of Anonymous' unique voice that could not fit into the scope of this work. In the eternal quest to piece the Late Republic back together, an extremely valuable resource has hidden in plain view.

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